DeRose just recently wrote a post on Prosblogion (here) on the prospects of being a Christian in Philosophy. I hope he’s right, but I certainly tend to be more pessimistic. I wonder if there is a conceptual distinction between ‘a Christian doing Philosophy’ and ‘a Christian Philosopher’ that DeRose is not adequately appreciating. That said, however, do read it for yourself; be sure to read (or at least skim-through) the comments as well – they offer a good variety of divergent opinions.
Additionally, it might be interesting to chase reading DeRose’s post along with Plantinga’s “Advice to Christian Philosophers” (again, note the ‘Christian doing Philosophy’ vs. ‘Christian Philosopher’ distinction).
March 10, 2009 at 1:52 pm
I was wondering about the Christian philosopher/Christian doing philosophy distinction. Is ‘Christian philosophy’ the kind of thing people list as an AoS? I take it that, if so, it’s a bit different to ‘Philosophy of religion’ or ‘epistemology’ because it presumably carries with it a strong presumption of being a Christian (to say the least). Is that the kind of distinction it’s being used to mark?
March 12, 2009 at 10:32 am
Thanks for the comment, Tom. The Christian philosopher/Christian doing philosophy distinction I had in mind focuses on whether or not one’s Christianity plays any role in the way he/she does philosophy. By ‘a Christian doing Philosophy’ I had in mind a Christian who’s Christianity plays little to no role in the way he/she does philosophy. I think this description could by in large apply to Keith DeRose – little of his work happens to be distinctly Christian. By ‘Christian philosopher’, on the other hand, I had in mind someone who is doing philosophy as a Christian, which is to say his/her views, opinions, arguments, presuppositions, (intuitions?) etc. are largely informed by his/her commitment to Christianity.
By such lights, I think what DeRose says about the ease at which someone can be ‘a Christian doing philosophy’ is correct – after all, so understood, one’s Christianity need never really come up his/her professional arena. In contrast, however, I don’t think it is so easy to be a ‘Christian philosopher’ – I often get the impression that if one’s Christian commitment greatly influences his/her philosophy (especially if such a commitment leads him/her to any sort of political conservatism!) he/she will be seen as at best changing the subject or at worst stupid or insane. Let me finish by quoting Plantinga’s highly entertaining thoughts on the topic of him being labeled a ‘Fundamentalist’. It is largely on topic (though not entirely), but, truth be told, I primarily wish to quote it because I find it so highly entertaining
“On the most common contemporary academic use of the term, [‘fundamentalist’] is a term of abuse or disapprobation, rather like ‘son of a bitch’, more exactly ‘sonovabitch’, or perhaps still more exactly (at least according to those authorities who look to the Old West as normative on matters of pronunciation) ‘sumbitch’. When the term is used in this way, no definition of it is ordinarily given. (If you called someone a sumbitch, would you feel obliged first to define the term?) Still, there is a bit more to the meaning of ‘fundamentalist’ (in this widely current use): it isn’t simply a term of abuse. In addition to its emotive force, it does have some cognitive content, and ordinarily denotes relatively conservative theological views. That makes it more like ‘stupid sumbitch’ (or maybe ‘fascist sumbitch’?) than ‘sumbitch’ simpliciter. It isn’t exactly like that term either, however, because its cognitive content can expand and contract on demand; its content seems to depend on who is using it. In the mouths of certain liberal theologians, for example, it tends to denote any who accept traditional Christianity, including Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and Barth; in the mouth of devout secularists like Richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennett, it tends to denote anyone who believes there is such a person as God. The explanation is that the term has a certain indexical element: its cognitive content is given by the phrase ‘considerably to the right, theologically speaking, of me and my enlightened friends.’ The full meaning of the term, therefore, (in this use), can be given by something like ‘stupid sumbitch whose theological opinions are considerably to the right of mine’.”
-Warranted Christian Belief pg. 245.
March 27, 2009 at 2:09 pm
I really appreciate Plantiga’s reflections! Ian, how are we defining Christian here? That term can span a wide arena and then the differences even further. In the case of a reformed believer doing philosophy or a reformed philosopher, I would hope that both positions would hold the same ground. Is not who we are as Christians supposed to impact all areas of our lives, including our work, thoughts, and philosphy? So whether we were a Christian philosopher or a Christian doing philosophy, it should make no difference. But it does because the term “Christian” is used so loosely and applied so liberally. How could a a Christian, holding to Christian ethics, seperate that while doing philosophy? Is that possible?