What affect does a Kuyperian conception of worldviews have on our understanding of truth? Furthermore, how does this conception of truth affect our epistemology? If we give the mantra “brute facts are mute facts” a strong reading (like I think we should if we are Presuppositionalist/Kuyperian), then how we think of basic propositions like “the window is open” will take on a whole new character – perhaps even driving epistemology into a (mostly) non-factive direction! While the idea of a (mostly) non-factive epistemology might seem a bit mad at first blush, I have increasingly grown to wonder if such a view is not only plausible but perhaps even proper, especially for Reformed Epistemology! Though I am going in a rather different direction, it should be noted that I have Mark Wales to thank for first planting the seeds of a non-factive epistemology in my mind. J

 

If we can only know facts from the context of and within our worldview such that we never come in direct epistemic contact with them in their “brute” form, perhaps the traditional requirement of truth is too demanding. After all, if we didn’t have truth as a necessary condition for knowledge all sorts of epistemic problems would fall away (i.e. most if not all forms of skepticism, Gettier problems, etc.); however, the challenge then becomes sustaining a non-factive epistemology without sounding absolutely insane. It seems intuitively repugnant (at least to me) to say that we can know “the window is open” when in fact it is shut.

 

Let me briefly propose two avenues a Kuyperian taking this view of epistemology might use to dim-down the crazy:

·         First of all, keep anchored to truth. Non-factive epistemology becomes quite troubling if it is fully non-factive; such that someone can go around making knowledge claims without any connection to reality and without any normative epistemic repercussions. That is why I have been parenthetically suggesting at best a mostly non-factive epistemology. What could be the anchor? I think the best bet for the Kuyperian are basic/foundational religious beliefs that are presupposed  to be true via epistemic trust or faith (and I would argue that they are, as such, Gettier proof and highly resistant to skepticism), perhaps of the sort found in Crispin Wright’s Entitlement of Cognitive Project.

·         Secondly, abandon the justified-true-belief conception of knowledge. I would expect that if non-factive epistemology is going to be the least bit tenable it cannot see knowledge as simply justified belief. The necessarily conditions for knowledge must be re-worked to incorporate the aforementioned anchor. What this would look like in the end, I am not sure.

 

Could a “brain-in-a-vat” type of person have knowledge according to this account if anchored with the appropriate presuppositions? Should a Kuyperian even have such a strong reading of “brute facts are mute facts?” How does this theory relate to philosophy of language at large? What kind of philosophical methodology does this view advocate? There are many such hurdles to this kind of epistemology that I won’t begin to explicate here; I simply wanted to propose this conception of a Kuyperian theory of knowledge to see what feedback (if any) I can get.