I once heard it preached, based on 1 Corinthians 8, that though alcohol isn’t inherently sinful to drink, we none-the-less morally should not drink alcohol lest we make those who do see it as inherently wrong ‘stumble’. I call this a Second-Order Prohibition Ethic (where the First-Order Prohibition Ethic is the belief that alcohol is inherently sinful). As it was preached, this principle was far reaching: not only should I not drink alcohol knowingly and directly in front of someone who thinks it is wrong, but I should not drink alcohol at all since someone somewhere might find out about it who thinks it is wrong (thus possibly making them stumble). Since 1 Corinthians 8 does not directly deal with alcohol, I see no reason why this ethical principle couldn’t generalize to:
The General Second-Order Prohibition Ethic (hereafter GSOPE): For any action x, if any S anywhere thinks x is wrong (even incorrectly so), then no one should (morally) do x.
I would like to briefly propose that this, as it stands, is an impossible ethical principle that, if true, wholly usurps Christianity. The problem is that so generalized, GSOPE makes it unreasonably hard to be moral. According to GSOPE, my working on my computer right now (and your using your computer to read this post) is morally wrong since some people think it is wrong to use electricity. Similar judgments could be made concerning using tobacco, playing dice, drinking caffeine, getting a social security number, voting, getting medical treatment, getting baptized in any way shape or form instead of another, and so on (it doesn’t seem to matter how irrational the ethical assessment seems). Even worse, a necessary conclusion of GSOPE is that Jesus Christ was not morally blameless since he did any number of things that people thought were morally wrong (i.e. healing people on the Sabbath), and as such the whole framework of the atoning substitutionary death of Christ falls apart and orthodox Christianity with it.
While this doesn’t disprove all Christian prohibition ethics, it does disprove any that rely on or could be generalized to GSOPE. As such, it should go without saying that GSOPE is not fitting for Reformed Philosophy.
March 21, 2008 at 8:19 am
Ian, this post is why we need philosophers like you in the church. You really clarified the issue and in so doing exposed the weakness of a common, selectively-applied, ethical principle. I’ll drink to that (grape juice, of course, because isn’t that what Jesus drank?).
March 24, 2008 at 11:24 am
Ian,
Today was my first read of your blog. Not only does it look good, but I am excited by the depth of content.
Question on the content of this particular post, what about the application of GSOPE in the direct presence of an objector? Thus the clause, “if any S anywhere thinks x is wrong (even incorrectly so)” would be changed to “if any S in the presence of a person doing action x thinks x is wrong (even incorrectly so)”. This seems to drastically reduce the scope of the problem and is perhaps a little closer to the Pauline ethic (e.g. Rom 10:28). I’d love to see your thoughts.
March 24, 2008 at 3:56 pm
Patrick,
I’m delighted that you like the blog!
So general proposal is to go from:
GSOPE: For any action x, if any S anywhere thinks x is wrong (even incorrectly so), then no one should (morally) do x.
To something like:
GSOPE*: For any action x, if any S is in the presence of an agent ‘A’ and S thinks x is wrong (even incorrectly so), then A should not (morally) do x.
Would the following be any better? :
GSOPE**: For any action x, if 1) any S is in the presence of an agent A and 2) S thinks x is wrong (even incorrectly so) and 3) A is aware of S’s moral conviction concerning x, then A should not (morally) do x.
I think something like GSOPE* or GSOPE** is closer to my default position; however, I still have some concerns. Might the case be made that if GSOPE* or GSOPE** is a moral principle, Christ was morally blameworthy when, for example, he healed on the Sabbath in front of the Pharisees (Luke 14:1-6)? That would certainly be a very unwelcome conclusion.
How might we get around this? We could try to deny that the case of Christ and the Pharisees meets all of the conjuncts at the front of the GSOPE*(*) conditional, but this doesn’t initially seem tenable to me. Perhaps, instead, the ethical principle advocated by Paul in Romans 14 and 1 Corinthians 8 intimately involves a ‘heart issue’ (as vague as that is). Perhaps when Christ healed someone on the Sabbath in front of the Pharisees his heart was ‘in the right place’, where if I were to drink alcohol in front of someone who thought alcohol was inherently wrong to drink, then my heart, more than likely, would not be ‘in the right place’. Admittedly, the idea of heart-principles is hard for me to analyze, and I am not even sure if this is the right way to go.
This is a fascinating topic, and I by no means have it figured entirely out yet. Thanks for your comments Patrick. If you have any further feedback, I would appreciate reading it.
Best wishes,
-Ian